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COLORADO SUPREME COURT PREVENTS
COLLATERAL ATTACK ON PREVIOUSLY
LITIGATED CHANGE OF USE DECREES
R. WOODRUFF CURRAN AND PAULJ. ZILIS:
I.

INTRODUCTION

As Colorado's population has grown during the past century, the
need for more water in municipalities has caused many water suppliers
to purchase irrigation water rights with early priority dates and change
the use of those rights to municipal uses. Most watersheds are
overappropriated for much of the year, and municipalities must be
aggressive in both obtaining and protecting their water rights. In
FarmersHigh Line Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden,' a case recently
decided by the Colorado Supreme Court ("Supreme Court"), several
water suppliers brought an action in water court to protect their water
rights from injury due to alleged overuse of a senior, upstream water
user under change of use decrees entered during the 1960s. The
FarmersHighlinedecision narrows the range of issues that can be raised
regarding previously litigated change of use decrees, particularly those
based upon assertions that decrees which do not include volumetric
limitations must be governed by implied limitations.
11. BACKGROUND

A basic tenet of Colorado water law, commonly referred to as the
"no injury" rule, is that the vested rights of other appropriators cannot
be injured when a water right is changed. The terms and conditions
included in change of use decrees to prevent such injury have evolved
over the years as engineering practices and technologies have
improved. In change of use cases litigated before the 1970s, applicants
were typically required to protect junior water rights by abandoning
some of their water rights to the stream, thereby limiting the use of the
changed water rights to their historic consumptive use. Decrees
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approving changes of water rights typically included flow limitations,
use limitations, and abandonment requirements.
Improved engineering and technology have afforded the water
courts more precision in applying the "no injury" rule. Change
decrees now typically include detailed volumetric limits scientifically
based on the historic consumptive use. Furthermore, volumetric limits
have been implied into some older decrees for change of use in order
to prevent enlarged uses of the changed water rights. However,
change in use decrees awarded without the accuracy of these improved
determinations may be exposed to litigation where juniors assert
expanded use.
I.

FARMERS IIGHLINE CANAL

& RESERVOIR Co. . CTY OF GOLDEN

In Farmers Highline, Farmers High Line Canal and Reservoir
Company, Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Company, and the cities of
Westminster, Thornton, and Arvada ("the Plaintiffs") filed a complaint
in water court against the City of Golden ("Golden") alleging that
Golden was using more water than its decrees permitted. The decrees
in question were court-approved consent decrees entered in two
change of use cases during the early 1960s.
A.

ISSUES PRESENTED

The case raised two issues: (1) under what circumstances are
implied limitations applicable to previously litigated decrees not
containing volumetric limits; and (2) does claim or issue preclusion
protect such a change of use decree from the addition of implied
volumetric limitations years after a decree has been entered.
B.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The decrees at issue in this case were based on a senior water right
known as Clear Creek Priority 12 ("Priority 12"), originally decreed in
a general adjudication in October 1884 with an appropriation date of
May 1861. In 1957, Golden approached two owners of Priority 12
water and offered to buy a portion of their water rights.3 The owners
applied to the water court to change the decreed uses of their portion
of the Priority 12 water right from irrigation to municipal use. In the
water court, Golden's water engineer, W.W. Wheeler, testified that
Golden could receive 2.86 cubic feet per second ("cfs") without
injuring junior water rights.4 The water court denied the application
ruling Golden had failed to present sufficient evidence to support a
showing that juniors would not suffer injury.5 The Supreme Court
reversed on the ground that the trial court was required to assist in the

2. See Orr v. Arapahoe Water & Sanitation Dist., 753 P.2d 1217, 1226 (Colo. 1988).
3. FarmersHighline,1999WL 167671, at *2.
4. Id. at *3.
5. Id.
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development of a decree which would protect junior water rights
holders.6
The parties to that case ultimately developed a consent decree that
the water court approved in 1961.' While the decree contained no
express volumetric limitations, it included terms and conditions
intended to protect junior water rights. The decree required Golden
to dry up the lands previously irrigated with the transferred water and
limited Golden's actual use of 2.86 cfs of Priority 12 water by two
requirements: (1) 0.84 cfs of the transferred water had to be
abandoned to the stream; and (2) the diversions had to be limited to
the irrigation months of May to October. 8
Golden's other decree at issue in this case, a consent decree
approved in 1964, contained the same terms as the 1961 decree and
covered Golden's purchase of 1.8 cfs of additional Priority 12 water
rights from another party. The same water engineer prepared an
engineering study that formed the basis for these terms.9
While no volumetric limits were developed during the 1960s
litigation or negotiations, Golden did quantify its use of Priority 12
water while opposing another water application in 1993.°
Consolidated Mutual ("Con Mutual"), another owner of Priority 12
water rights, applied in 1992 to change the use of 2.5855 cfs of Priority
12 water from agricultural to municipal use. Golden opposed Con
Mutual's application arguing that Con Mutual's change of use would
injure Golden's portion of the Priority 12 water right unless the
resulting decree included a volumetric limitation. In determining
what that limit should be, Golden's water engineer provided testimony
regarding the historic consumptive use of Priority 12 water by both
Golden and Con Mutual based on the 1960s testimony and
documentation of W.W. Wheeler. The water court adopted the
calculations and volumetric limits asserted by Golden in Con Mutual's
decree in that case."
C. THE CURRENT CASE
The Plaintiffs in this action alleged that Golden was acting outside
the authority of its change of use decrees by exceeding the volumetric
limits that should be implied, by changing the timing of its diversions,
and by changing the extent of its lawn irrigation. The Plaintiffs'
primary argument was that volumetric limits are implied as a matter of
law in all decrees. The Plaintiffs also asserted that Golden had
quantified a limit during the 1993 Con Mutual litigation and should
6. Mannon v. Farmers' High Line Canal & Reservoir Co., 360 P.2d 417, 423
(1961) (stating "[t]he trial court.., is required to do more than passively hear the
evidence; it has an active role in the administration of valuable and vital rights ... .
7. Fa&mersHighline,1999 WL 167671, at *3.
8. Id.
9. Id. at *4.
10. Id.
11. Id. at "4-5.
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therefore be either judicially estopped or prevented by claim
preclusion from arguing that volumetric limits are not applicable to its
decrees."
Additionally, the Plaintiffs asserted two factually based claims: (1)
that Golden had enlarged its use by altering the use patterns of its
Priority 12 water from a supplemental supply during summer months
to a year-round, base supply; and (2) that Golden had increased the
percentage of Priority 12 water being used to irrigate lawns, thereby
undermining the analysis relied upon in the issuance of the 1960s
decrees.
The Plaintiffs argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Orr v.
Arapahoe Water & Sanitation District," required incorporating
volumetric limits into Golden's 1960s decrees. 4 Golden defended its
decrees on the basis that claim and issue preclusion prevented relitigation of the 1960s decrees. 5 Although the water court initially
denied Golden's motion for summary judgment on this issue, it ruled
after a trial that the Plaintiffs could not attack the terms of the
previous decrees. The water court distinguished Orr on the grounds
that its holding applies only to decrees arising from
6 cases in which the
issue of historic consumptive use was not litigated.
The Supreme Court affirmed the water court's ruling.
In
highlighting the role that claim and issue preclusion often play in
water rights litigation, the Supreme Court resolved some of the tension
between the preclusive effect of final decrees and the need to allow
claims of injury to be litigated based upon subsequent enlarged uses of
water.
The Supreme Court held that the request to add volumetric
limitations to Golden's 1960s change of use decrees was properly
dismissed by the water court as an issue previously litigated and
determined. The Supreme Court held that the water court properly
limited the Orr decision to change of use proceedings in which no
quantification of historic use was litigated. During the proceedings
that led to the entry of decrees for Golden's change of water rights,
expert analysis formed the basis for the decrees. The decrees also
included flow limitations and season of use limitations. Finally, the
amount of water abandoned to the stream was based on the expert
witness' analysis of historic return flows. In a case where historic use
has been litigated, the determination of historic use is final, and
subsequent litigation of the issue is precluded.
The Plaintiffs also argued that issue preclusion and judicial
estoppel prevented Golden from denying the existence of volumetric
limitations on the two disputed decrees. Issue preclusion was asserted
12. Id. at *5.
13. Orr v. Arapahoe Water & SanitationDist., 753 P.2d at 1217 (Colo. 1988).
14. See id. at 1226.
15. Farmers High Line, 1999 WL 167671, at *6.
16. Id. at *7.
17. Id. at*12.

Issue 2

FARMERS HIGH LINE CANAL

on the basis of testimony given by Golden's expert witness during the
1993 Con Mutual litigation. Since testimony in that action appeared
to limit Golden's claim under the 1960s decrees to specific volumetric
amounts, the Plaintiffs argued that actual litigation of that issue in
1993 should preclude Golden from arguing otherwise in subsequent
litigation. The Supreme Court held that the 1960s decrees were final
and unassailable on the issue of implied limitations in later
proceedings. Evidence from the 1993 litigation could not achieve
indirectly that which would not be allowed directly in this case.
Additionally, the Supreme Court held that judicial estoppel was
inappropriate because Golden had not taken truly contradictory
positions in the same or related litigation."8 Judicial estoppel prevents
a prevailing party from adopting a new legal position in the same or
related litigation which conflicts with an earlier successful position.' 9
Additionally, the Supreme Court ruled that Golden did not receive a
benefit as a result of the position it took in the 1993 litigation, another
condition required for the doctrine to apply. Golden was not bound
by their expert testimony in the 1993 litigation because Golden's legal
position throughout that action was that no volumetric limits apply to
Golden's 1960s decrees for its Priority 12 water rights.
The Plaintiffs were successful in arguing however, that factual
allegations of enlarged use since the entry of the 1960s consent
decrees could not be dismissed on the basis of issue or claim
preclusion.20 The Supreme Court held that the claims of enlarged
water use which were based on claims of changed circumstances or
changes in operating procedures by Golden were not precluded by the
1960s decrees as argued by Golden. Golden was not permitted to
enlarge the use of its decreed rights and then use the 1960s decrees as
a bar to the Plaintiffs' claims of injury based on that enlarged use.
Since expanded municipal uses could not have been litigated during
the
those earlier
21 proceedings, those claims were correctly heard by
water court.
Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court found sufficient evidence
in the record to sustain the water court's ruling that Golden generally
had not changed its pattern of diversions in such a manner as to cause
injury to the Plaintiffs. The only issue remanded to the water court
was whether Golden had enlarged its use by increasing the percentage
of Priority 12 water used to irrigate lawns. The water court had not
expressly ruled on that issue, so the Supreme Court deemed a factual
determination necessary before complete conclusion of the case.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASE
This decision has further defined the extent to which previous

18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at* 13.
Id.
Id. at *14.
Id. at*15.
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change of use decrees can be attacked. Water rights have been
repeatedly transferred and the uses of those water rights have changed
throughout this century. In all likelihood, most change of use decrees
entered before the 1970s do not contain the implied limitations
required by the Orr decision. This recent decision makes clear that
not every change of use decree lacking a volumetric limitation is
vulnerable to attack, although holders of such rights are still required
to ensure that they do not provide grounds for future litigation by
changing or enlarging the uses they make of such water.

